The CPLP member states -- and especially Angola and Brazil -- wish to strengthen their bilateral economic relations with Equatorial Guinea, and benefit from its oil and gas wealth, as well as reinforce their geopolitical influence within the Gulf of Guinea. Unlike Angola and Brazil, Portugal's political and economic bilateral interests are of little relevance. However, Portugal will have to try to find a balance that embraces the interests and beliefs of domestic and external players.
Table of Contents: Sean Goforth, "Brazil: Dilma's dilemma" Marina Costa Lobo, "Equatorial Guinea fakes reforms to enter the CPLP" Gerhard Seibert, "São Tomé and Príncipe: in the third attempt and after twenty years, a former autocrat returns to the presidency" Timeline of Events
NOVEMBER 2010 -- Table of Contents: Pedro Seabra, "Cape Verde’s NSDSC: Adapting to a crude reality" Kai Thaler, "Mega-projects, pollution, and divergent development models in Mozambique" Vasco Martins, "Timor Leste: The frontline in Australia’s ‘boat’ policy?" José Carlos Matias, "The Macau Forum: China’s charm offensive for Lusophone countries" Timeline of Events Reading List
Manuel Alegre, member of the Portuguese Parliament elected by the Socialist Party and presidential candidate, said last week that the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) should have a military component, i.e. a reaction force. According to Alegre, this military component would intervene only in Portuguese-speaking countries.
Alegre is assuming that the Lusophone countries have capacity to project power by themselves in countries as far as Timor Leste. In other words, he is ignoring the logistical difficulties inherent to the deployment of a military force.
However, even if they did have capacity to do so, in the end the main issue is political. Alegre did not go as far as supporting a CPLP military force. But at this stage even the possibility of a reaction force under the umbrella of the CPLP is an awkward idea. Assuming that the member states were willing to do so – a great leap of faith: last April, no one was enthusiastic about the idea of sending a military force to Guinea-Bissau… – one should not forget that Article 5 of the CPLP demands compliance with the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of each state. Thus, CPLP would always require a formal request to intervene. In other words, a reaction force would be helpless if the request was not done.
In the end, a UN Security Council resolution would be required. Moreover, there is no reason why a UN peacekeeping force could not be composed mainly – or exclusively – by military forces from the Lusophone countries.
Last but not the least, it is difficult to grasp what were the benefits brought by such reaction force. Why should only Portuguese-speaking countries intervene in Lusophone states? Does this mean that the Portuguese military should leave Lebanon or Kosovo?
This cultural/linguistic vision of military interventions is a Pandora's Box. One should think twice before open it.
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Opponents of Equatorial Guinea’s acceptance as a member of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) justify their stance with two main arguments. The first brings forward the nature of the regime, i.e. CPLP should not accept as a member an authoritarian regime. The main problem with this regime argument is that, when it was established in 1996, the CPLP was never meant to be a club of democracies. More important, as far as the nature of the regime is concerned, the CPLP continues to be a club of different regimes. Indeed, in 2010, Angola is ranked by the Freedom House as “not free”, and Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Timor Leste as “partly free”. In other words, why should CPLP demand to Equatorial Guinea more than is required to the current members?
The other argument against membership is the language. Portuguese is not an official language in Equatorial Guinea and the CPLP in Article 6 says explicitly that the Portuguese as an official language is a requirement regarding membership. Equatorial Guinea announced already that it would adopt the Portuguese as an official language. Thus, as long as it matches words with deeds, the language argument does not make much sense either.
In my view, the pros and cons of Equatorial Guinea’s membership lie elsewhere. One should think exactly how its acceptance brings added value to the organization. The CPLP will become a stronger multilateral institution if Equatorial Guinea is accepted as a member? Why? Will it bring additional power resources? More soft power? Enlarged regional influence? In other words, what will be delivered by Equatorial Guinea to CPLP? And, is this something valued by CPLP?
The answers to the questions above should determine the fate of Equatorial Guinea’s membership request.
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Brazilian President Lula da Silva went to Malabo yesterday. A few days earlier, Cape Verdean President Pedro Pires met Equatorial Guinean President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo. Portuguese Foreign Minister Luís Amado also met Equatorial Guinea's President in May. The list of high-level contacts in the last few months could continue. Despite some resistance, Equatorial Guinea is increasingly closer of being a CPLP member...
